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NOTES
THE ELEPHANT IN THE COURTROOM: LITIGATING THE
PREMERGER FIX IN ARCH COAL AND BEYOND
INTRODUCTION
In FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc.,' Judge Bates described the proposed
remedy' to an allegedly anticompetitive acquisition as the "elephant
in the room."3 When the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sought
in district court to enjoin Arch Coal, Inc.'s (Arch Coal) acquisition
of Triton Coal Co. (Triton) in 2004,4 Arch Coal attempted to
introduce evidence of its intent to sell a coal mine to a third party
to resolve FTC antitrust concerns.5 The FTC, however, and not the
1. 329 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2004).
2. For practical purposes, this Note uses the term "remedy" to refer to a sale or license
of assets, structured after a company signed a merger agreement, responding to and
attempting to resolve antitrust concerns raised by the FTC or DOJ. Courts and parties avoid
calling these fixes "remedies"; such terminology arguably brings the transaction within the
FTC's purview. In a legal sense, such proposals may not be properly termed "remedies" in
preliminary injunctions because the antitrust violation has not yet occurred. But certainly,
in a practical sense, parties structure a divestiture or licensing agreement for remedial
purposes-to rescue their transaction from antitrust action. See infra Part III for a
discussion of how courts have distinguished between a "remedy" and a proposed divestiture
that is merely part of the initial transaction.
3. Memorandum Opinion at 8, FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C.
2004) (No. 04-0534) [hereinafter Memorandum Opinion].
4. See Arch Coal, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 114; see also Complaint for Preliminary Injunction
Pursuant to FTC Act § 13(b) at 4, FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2004)
(No. 04-0534) [hereinafter FTC Complaint], available at httpd/www.ftc.gov/os/200404
archcoalcmp.pdf.
5. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission's Motion in
Limine at 1, FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 04-0534)
[hereinafter FTC Memorandum].
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courts, traditionally possessed authority for evaluating and
ordering remedies in administrative trials.6
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, which was
jurisdictionally authorized to decide whether a preliminary
injunction should be granted, was left with a dilemma. By denying
evidence of the proposed divestiture, the court would analyze the
case without hearing critical aspects of the transaction. By choosing
to admit evidence of the proposed divestiture, the court would strip
the FTC of powerful tools in antitrust enforcement.7
Prior to Arch Coal, some courts considered evidence of proposed
remedies but concluded that the transactions should still be
enjoined. After one such decision, an antitrust attorney observed
prophetically: "[Flor years, parties have contemplated presenting
the court with a different deal. There is going to be a case where the
parties are going to offer a deal that the FTC rejects and a court
accepts."8 Arch Coal was such a case.
District courts must balance their duty to examine the actual
transaction with preserving the authority carved out for the FTC in
statutes and case law. Courts can achieve this balance by admitting
evidence of a proposed fix only when parties construct FTC-
enforceable divestitures, demonstrate good-faith efforts to negotiate
6. See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 392 (1965) ("It has been
repeatedly held that the Commission has wide discretion in determining the type of order
that is necessary to cope with the unfair practices found ...."); Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355
U.S. 411, 413 (1958) ("Mhe Commission alone is empowered to develop that enforcement
policy best calculated to achieve the ends contemplated by Congress ...."); FTC v. Natl Lead
Co., 352 U.S. 419, 428 (1957) ("Mhe Commission is clothed with wide discretion in
determining the type of order that is necessary to bring an end to the unfair practices found
to exist."); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 726 (1948) ("[Ihe Commission has a wide
discretion generally in the choice of remedies to cope with trade problems entrusted to it....");
Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612 (1946) ("The Commission is the expert body to
determine what remedy is necessary to eliminate the unfair or deceptive trade practices
which have been disclosed."); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 704 (3d Cir.
1982) ("Primary responsibility for fashioning orders rests with the Commission.").
7. See, e.g., David Marcus & Jaret Seiberg, Walton Approves Fix-It-First, Nixes Deal,
DAILYDEAL, May 28,2002 (noting that structural changes to acquisitions may "frustrate the
agency's ability to evaluate the transaction because the facts would constantly be changing");
Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, 'FTC v. Libbey: A Pyrrhic Victory?, 227 N.Y.L.J. 3 (2002)
("Allowing the parties to amend their merger agreement and seek the court's approval of the
modified transaction would deprive the FTC of ... inordinate leverage .... ").
8. Marcus & Seiberg, supra note 7 (quoting Steve Newborn, partner at Weil, Gotshal
& Manges LLP and former FTC litigation director).
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with the FTC, and present viable, effective divestitures. This Note
will discuss the Arch Coal transaction, the standards used by courts
to determine whether they ought to examine proposed sales of
assets, and the policy considerations for considering such evidence.
Part I will examine the FTC's review of Arch Coal's Triton
acquisition, including the FTC's motion in limine to exclude
evidence of the proposed Buckskin sale. Part II will discuss
jurisdictional aspects of enforcement; specifically, it will explore
from where the FTC derives authority to challenge mergers and
how the FTC's burden under the Clayton Act differs from the
burdens of the Department of Justice (DOJ) or of private plaintiffs.
This Part will argue that although the legislature affords the FTC
special enforcement and adjudicative measures, the practical
implications of FTC suits for preliminary injunctions are often
identical to the implications of other public and private suits. Part
III will analyze the substantive differences involved when courts
decide whether to consider evidence of a proposed fix, and it will
argue that a strict standard of good faith and proven closeness to
the initial transaction should be employed. Finally, Part IV will
discuss policy implications for those impacted by antitrust enforce-
ment: the general public, which benefits from an efficient economy;
the FTC and the DOJ; private parties; and consumers. This Part
will argue that courts should afford significant deference to the
FTC's expertise within the law's confines.
I. THE INITIAL TRANSACTION AND PROPOSED BucKSKIN MINE SALE
A. Background
Arch Coal announced a definitive agreement to purchase Vulcan
Coal Holdings, the parent of Triton Coal, on May 29, 2003, for $364
million.9 Six weeks later, on July 11, 2003, Arch Coal and Triton
submitted pre-merger notification filings to the FTC and the DOJ,1
9. Press Release, Arch Coal, Inc., Arch Coal Signs Definitive Agreement To Acquire
Triton Coal Company (May 29, 2003), available at http'//www.shareholder.com/archcoa/
ReleaseDetail.cfm?ReleaseID=110216.
10. FTC Memorandum, supra note 5, at 3.
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pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act." The FTC requested
additional information (a "second request") from the parties in
August 2003.12 In December, Arch Coal informed the FTC of its
plans to sell the Buckskin mine (which Arch Coal was acquiring
from Triton) to Kiewit Mining (Kiewit).13 On January 30, 2004,
Arch Coal signed an agreement with Kiewit solidifying the sale. 14
On March 30, 2004, the FTC determined that the Buckskin sale
failed to resolve its antitrust concerns, and the agency filed for a
preliminary injunction to enjoin the Arch-Triton merger. 5
The FTC's complaint alleged that the Arch-Triton deal would
result in a four-to-three reduction of coal producers in Wyoming's
Southern Powder River Basin (SPRB) 6 (the FTC's alleged geo-
11. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000).
The Act mandates that every person acquiring more than $53.1 million worth of voting
securities or assets and every person divesting themselves of securities in that same value
range file with the FTC and DOJ prior to closing the transaction. The FTC and the DOJ
review the filings and must determine within thirty days if any possible antitrust harm
exists. If concerns persist, one agency may submit a request for more information from the
companies with the potential to move for a preliminary injunction to stop the transaction.
See id. § 18a(a)-(k); Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for section 7A of the Clayton Act, 70
Fed. Reg. 5020 (Jan. 31, 2005).
12. FTC Memorandum, supra note 5, at 3.
13. Id. at 1, 3.
14. ARCH COAL, INC., 2003ANNUALREPORT 1-11 (2004). Arch Coal's annual report merely
noted that "[tihe completion of the sale of the Buckskin mine is contingent, among other
things, on the completion of our acquisition of Triton," id., whereas the FTC described it as
a "self-help permanent remedy," FTC Memorandum, supra note 5, at 3.
15. See FTC Complaint, supra note 4, at 4. The FTC has authority to challenge mergers
that are potentially anticompetitive as defined in section 7 of the Clayton Act. Section 7
decrees that no person, subject to the FTC, shall acquire stock or capital if"the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 15
U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
16. See FTC Complaint, supra note 4, at 7. According to the FTC, Arch Coal, Peabody,
and Kennecott would be the three remaining postmerger competitors in the relevant market.
See id.
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graphic market) 7 that produce "8800 BTU SPRB coal"'" (the FTC's
alleged product market). 9 The complaint asserted that the Arch-
Triton transaction would "eliminate the existing substantial
competition" between Arch Coal and Triton and would facilitate
coordinated interaction among the remaining three firms.2" The
FTC further argued that the sale of Buckskin to Kiewit would not
resolve antitrust concerns.
B. FTC's Motion in Limine To Exclude Evidence of the Buckskin
Sale
On June 3, 2004, the FTC filed a motion in limine in the district
court to exclude evidence of Arch Coal's proposed sale of Buckskin.22
17. The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which provide "an analytical road map for
the evaluation of mergers," state that a merger analysis should determine product market,
geographic market, competitive effects, entry, and efficiencies. FED. TRADE COMM'N,
HoRIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1992) [hereinafter FTC MERGER GUIDELINES], available
at http'J/www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm. The Merger Guidelines define geographic market
as "a region such that a hypothetical monopolist that was the only present or future producer
of the relevant product at locations in that region would profitably impose at least a 'small
but significant and nontransitory' increase in price." Id. § 1.21.
18. See FTC Complaint, supra note 4, at 5, 19. "The SPRB is a source of low sulphur coal
that has an energy content of between approximately 8300 and 8800 British Thermal Units
[BTUs] per pound." Id. SPRB coal has physical properties that give it a "strong economic
advantage" over coal produced elsewhere in the United States. Id. at 5.
19. The Merger Guidelines define product market as "a product or group ofproducts such
that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm that was the only present and future seller of
those products ('monopolist') likely would impose at least a 'small but significant and
nontransitory' increase in price." FTC MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 17, § 1.11.
20. FTC Complaint, supra note 4, at 19. Arch Coal denied many of the FTC's assertions,
including those regarding geographic market, product market, anticompetitive effects, and
the effect of the Buckskin sale. See Answer of Defendant Arch Coal Inc. to the Federal Trade
Commission's Administrative Complaint at 2, 4, 6, FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d
109 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 04-0534), available at http'J/www.ftc.gov/os/caselistI031O19l/040428
archcoalanswertocmplnt.pdf. Arch Coal conceded that the SPRB region generates coal with
low ash and sodium levels. Id. at 3. Ultimately, the Arch Coal court decided that the SPRB
constituted the relevant geographic market but that the relevant product market included
both 8800 and 8400 BTU coal. Arch Coal, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 122-23.
21. FTC Complaint, supra note 4, at 20 ("The transfer by Arch ofTriton's Tier 3 Buckskin
mine to Kiewit does not remedy the potential anticompetitive effects of the Acquisition in the
SPRB or in 8800 coal. Buckskin and R.A.G. would be unable to constrain a coordinated price
increase in the SPRB.").
22. See Motion in Limine by PlaintiffFederal Trade Commission To Exclude All Evidence
and Argument on the Issue of Remedy at 1-2, FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109
(D.D.C. 2004) (No. 04-0534).
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The FTC asserted that the Buckskin sale constituted "permanent
relief-a structural remedy that the FTC alone should construct if
necessary.23 If the district court approved Buckskin's sale, that
measure could damage the market's status quo during an adminis-
trative trial. 4 Arch Coal countered that the district court must
consider the Buckskin sale; to do otherwise would result in "a
purely hypothetical transaction of the Commission's making-that
none of the parties are proposing."25 The court denied the motion in
limine, noting that the district court, not the FTC, bears responsi-
bility for defining the transaction.26 The court suggested that the
Buckskin sale was not merely a remedy, and that the relevant
dispute was "the set of two transactions involving the acquisition of
Triton by Arch and the immediate divestiture of the Buckskin mine
to Kiewit."27
The court's decision to include the Buckskin sale as part of the
transaction seriously impaired the FTC's ability to secure a
preliminary injunction.2" The court included Kiewit as one of the
five remaining competitors in the SPRB and therefore changed the
analysis from a five-to-four reduction in market participants to no
reduction at all.29 The court's decision to consider Kiewit as the new
owner of Buckskin also lowered the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) value-a tool used to determine market concentration by
adding together the squared market shares of the companies
23. See FTC Memorandum, supra note 5, at 6-8.
24. See id. at 2. "Consideration by this Court of what remedy would be necessary and
appropriate would preempt the Commission's ability to carry out its responsibilities under
the Acts and, should the Commission find the Acquisition to be illegal, order the necessary
and appropriate relief." Id.
25. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine Regarding
Kiewit's Purchase of the Buckskin Mine at 2, FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109
(D.D.C. 2004) (No. 04-0534) [hereinafter Defendants' Memorandum] (on file with author).
26. See Memorandum Opinion, supra note 3, at 6-7.
27. Id. at 5.
28. See, e.g., Janet L. McDavid & Gretchen Fritz, 'Arch' and 'Oracle' Cases, NATL L. J.,
Nov. 1, 2004, at 10. ("[The court] denied a preliminary injunction in large part because it
found that Arch Coal's plan to sell the mine to Kiewit resolved the competitive concerns
resulting from the merger.").
29. See Arch Coal, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 124 ("There are currently five significant producers
of SPRB coal .... Post-merger, there will still be five significant producers of SPRB coal, with
Kiewit replacing Triton as an SPRB producing entity."). The court included R.A.G. American
as a competitor in its analysis because the court's market definition included 8800 and 8400
BTU mines. Id. at 121-24.
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participating in the market.3 ° The court also seemed persuaded by
evidence that Kiewit intended to increase production in the newly
acquired Buckskin mine by "several million tons" each year.3 '
Although it is impossible to determine definitively whether the
district court would have denied the injunction without considering
Kiewit's participation, the Buckskin sale was a significant factor in
the court's analysis and conclusion. The next Part will examine
whether the district court's jurisdiction permitted it to admit
evidence of the proposed sale.
II. STATUTORY AUTHORITY IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
A. FTC Enforcement
The FTC asserted that federal statutes and case law holdings
granted the agency sole power to consider evidence of the Buckskin
sale, but the Arch Coal court disagreed.32 This conflict resulted, in
part, from different standards established in the Clayton Act and
in the FTC Act. In section 11 of the Clayton Act, Congress outlined
specific adjudicative mechanisms for the FTC, as compared to
prosecutorial or other legal mechanisms for the DOJ or private
plaintiffs.33 Statutory language vests the FTC with authority to
enforce elements of both the Clayton Act and the FTC Act through
administrative trials,34 whereas the DOJ must bring claims in
district court.
30. See id. at 124. Although conceding that the HHI was sufficiently high to meet the
FTC's prima facie burden, the court determined that the HHI was not sufficiently high to
make a "strong" prima facie case. Id. at 129.
31. See id. at 148.
32. See Memorandum Opinion, supra note 3, at 7. "Even under Section 13(b), this Court's
task in determining the likelihood of the FTC's success ... requires the Court to review the
entire transaction in question." Id.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (2000).
34. See, e.g., FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339, 1342 (4th Cir. 1976).
The district court is not authorized to determine whether the antitrust laws
have been or are about to be violated. That adjudicatory function is vested in
FTC in the first instance. The only purpose of a proceeding under § 13 is to
preserve the status quo until FTC can perform its function.
2006] 1787
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Although the Clayton Act states that the FTC determines
whether an antitrust violation has occurred or will occur, a district
court ultimately decides whether to grant a preliminary
injunction. 5 Before granting an injunction, a district court must
assess whether the FTC will prevail at the administrative proceed-
ing. The court grants a preliminary injunction if it finds the action
"would be in the public interest-as determined by a weighing of
the equities and a consideration of the Commission's likelihood of
success on the merits."" District courts can only determine the
public interest impact after carefully analyzing the relevant
transaction.
Section 11 of the Clayton Act grants special adjudicatory
provisions for enforcement actions brought by the FTC that are not
available to the DOJ or to private plaintiffs. The Clayton Act
decrees that the FTC will serve a complaint on a party, hear
testimony in the FTC's office, "make a report in writing," and that
the accused company must "cease and desist from such violations."37
After this proceeding, a court of appeals may "affirm, enforce,
modify, or set aside" the FTC's decision. 8
In Arch Coal, the FTC filed a motion in limine to narrow the
district court's scope of review and to preserve evidence of the
remedy for its administrative trial. In most cases, the district court
interacts with the FTC only to grant or deny preliminary injunc-
tions before the FTC conducts a trial on the merits. Under section
13(b) of the FTC Act, the FTC may sue in district court to enjoin a
party that "is violating, or is about to violate" an FTC-enforced law,
so long as enjoining the transaction promotes the "interest of the
public" while the FTC administrative trial occurs.39
The FTC may still proceed with an administrative trial if the
district court denies the preliminary injunction, but its task
becomes much more difficult. Prior to 1973, when Congress granted
to the FTC the ability to obtain preliminary injunctions, the FTC
35. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2000).
36. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing 15 U.S.C. §
53(b)).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 21(b).
38. Id. § 21(d).
39. Id. § 53(b)(1)-(2).
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could merely issue cease-and-desist orders after antitrust violations
occurred.4 ° In a letter to the chairman of the Senate Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, the FTC's general counsel advocated
for congressional authorization of a preliminary injunction.4
General Counsel Ronald Dietrich emphasized that the FTC's ability
to enforce the antitrust laws was limited due to "its inability to
obtain preliminary relief once the problem has been fully discov-
ered."42 The FTC's ability to secure a preliminary injunction often
functions critically in preventing anticompetitive mergers.43 The
injunction prevents "scrambling the eggs--a term used to describe
two companies' functional, postmerger integration-if the adminis-
trative court finds a violation of either the Clayton Act or the FTC
Act.4
B. DOJ Enforcement
In Arch Coal, the FTC argued that case law regarding DOJ
antitrust enforcement did not apply because DOJ trials on the
merits occur at the district court level, whereas FTC trials on the
merits occur at the administrative level. 45 The DOJ has no ability
to adjudicate cases it brings under section 7 of the Clayton Act. The
Clayton Act requires that U.S. attorneys must prove section 7
violations in district court, which maintains "jurisdiction to prevent
40. 6 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED
STATUTES 4949 (Earl W. Kintner ed., 1983) [hereinafter ANTITRUST LEGISLATIVE HISTORY];
see also David M. Stryker, Note, The Federal Trade Commission, Injunctive Relief and
Allegedly Anticompetitive Mergers: Preliminary Relief Under the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 58 IND. L.J. 293, 294-95 (1982). Stryker argues that although "[the FTC undeniably
needed a procedure by which it could intervene more easily into the early stages of possible
anticompetitive behavior," section 13(b) does not suggest that "obtaining the injunction
should be substantively easier than [the] prior procedure." Id. at 297.
41. See Letter from Ronald M. Dietrich, FTC Gen. Counsel, to Senator Henry M. Jackson,
Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs (June 15, 1973), in ANTITRUST
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 40, at 4962.
42. Id.
43. Id. Dietrich further explained that the FTC had attempted "for a long time to have
... statutory authority to seek directly in the federal district courts preliminary injunctions
against the continuance of anticompetitive conduct." Id.
44. FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 159 (D.D.C. 2004). In Arch Coal, the
court believed only a modest level of integration would occur before the FTC concluded its
administrative proceeding. See id. at 160.
45. See Memorandum Opinion, supra note 3, at 7.
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and restrain violations."46 This procedural difference arguably
changes the DOJ's and the FTC's respective burdens of proof in
merger litigation.4 v As the ultimate decision maker of whether a
merger will substantially lessen competition, the FTC meets a
lower burden than does the DOJ in district court.48 Most DOJ suits
are brought immediately on the merits in motions for permanent
injunctions, as opposed to motions for preliminary injunctions.49
Whereas the FTC must prove that the transaction raises "serious
and substantial questions," the DOJ must demonstrate a section 7
violation in district court."0
C. Preliminary or Permanent? Statutory Differences and the
Reality of Preliminary Injunctions
Due to the importance of the preliminary injunction trial,
statutory differences establishing separate standards for the FTC
and the DOJ are insufficient to bar evidence like that of the
Buckskin sale. A district court's decision to grant or deny an
injunction may determine a transaction's very existence to such an
extent that ignoring divestiture evidence becomes impractical. If
46. 15 U.S.C. § 25 (2000).
47. See, e.g., Thomas B. Leary, An Inside Look at the Heinz Case, ANTITRUST, Spring
2002, at 32, 34 (2002) (discussing how FTC standards authorizing a preliminary injunction
may differ from DOJ standards). Leary notes that "the alternative of full deference to the
Commission's 'reason to believe' determination could create an awkward dichotomy between
the standards applied to Commission actions and similar actions by the [DOJ's] Antitrust
Division."
48. See Robert A. Skitol, How the Agencies' Clearance Agreement Can Affect Merger
Review Outcomes, FTC WATCH, May 22, 2002, available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.
org/recent2/187.cfin.
The FTC is better positioned than [the] DOJ to obtain a preliminary injunction
.... This is because the FTC has the benefit of Section 13(b) of the FTC Act,
which prescribes a standard for preliminary relief in FTC cases that is
considerably more deferential to the agency than the counterpart standard
applicable to DOJ cases.
Id.; see also Robert N. Cook & Robert A. Skitol, Fresh Thinking About the FTCIDOJ
Interface: Return to the Wilson-Brandeis-Elman Vision, ANTITRUST SoURCE, July 2002, at 1,
6, http'//www.abanet.org/antitrust/source/07-02/cookskitol.pdf ("Section 13(b) of the FTC Act
... provides a considerably more deferential standard than that confronting the DOJ under
general equity principles ....").
49. See Skitol, supra note 48.
50. See David Balto, Should There Be Differences Between the FTC and DOJ?, FTC
WATCH, May 22, 2002, available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.orgrecent2/187.cfm.
1790
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the court grants the preliminary injunction, most parties abandon
their deals altogether.5' If the court denies the preliminary
injunction, the FTC may proceed to an administrative trial but
often decides against such action. In Arch Coal, the FTC staff
dropped the complaint against Arch Coal and no administrative
adjudication occurred.52
Although the FTC is afforded discretion in fashioning permanent
relief, a district court must still evaluate the transaction under
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act. 3 Section 13(b) authorizes district
courts to form conclusions regarding how the transaction affects
public and private equities.54 The district court, although not
conducting a trial on the merits, must still determine if questions
were raised "going to the merits [that were] so serious, substantial,
difficult and doubtful as to make them fair ground for thorough
investigation" by the FTC and the court of appeals.55 In this task,
the court should consider carefully all factors that could impact the
transaction's anticompetitive effects.
An inherent problem exists in preliminary injunction proceed-
ings. The FTC can still adjudicate cases without obtaining a
51. See David Balto, The Efficiency Defense in Merger Review: Progress or Stagnation?,
ANTITRUST, Fall 2001, at 74, 79 ("The reality is that, with one exception, no firm has ever
continued to litigate a merger in administrative litigation with the FTC after losing the
preliminary injunction motion."); Geoffrey A. Manne & E. Marcellus Williamson, Hot Docs
vs. Cold Economics: The Use and Misuse of Business Documents in Antitrust Enforcement
and Adjudication, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 609, 642 (2005) ("As a practical matter, because of the
extraordinary time and expense involved in pursuing a full hearing at the Commission,
mergers challenged by the FTC are almost always won or lost at the preliminary injunction
stage."). In White Consolidated Industries, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., the plaintiffs claimed that
"if an injunction were denied, divestiture later would be impossible" and the defendants
countered that "if an injunction were granted, the deal was likely to fall apart long before a
hearing on the merits could take place." 612 F. Supp. 1009, 1012-13 (N.D. Ohio 1985),
vacated, 619 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ohio 1985), affd, 781 F.2d 1224 (6th Cir. 1986).
52. See In re Arch Coal, Inc., No. 9316,2004 FTC LEXIS 147 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Sept.
10, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9316/040910orderwithdraw
matterfromadjudi.pdf (order withdrawing matter from adjudication).
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2000).
54. See FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 727 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that the
primary public equity is the "effective enforcement of the antitrust laws").
55. FTC v. Beatrice Foods Co., 587 F.2d 1225, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1978). As former FTC
Commissioner Leary has noted, district court opinions certainly appear to discuss a case's
merits in detail. See Leary, supra note 47, at 34. These opinions presumably incorporate such
close analysis to determine the FTC's likelihood of success on the merits, rather than
deciding whether a violation occurred or will occur.
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preliminary injunction, but its powers are substantially lessened
without this tool.56 With the preliminary injunction, however, the
parties will likely abandon their transaction and will not proceed to
the administrative trial. The costs of proceeding to an administra-
tive trial while maintaining a merger agreement are, parties argue,
prohibitively high.57 The FTC cannot effectuate meaningful merger
review without obtaining a preliminary injunction. The preliminary
injunction becomes, however, the ultimate trial on the merits
despite different statutory requirements.
In Arch Coal, an administrative trial likely would not have
ensued if the court granted the preliminary injunction. Most parties
abandon preliminarily enjoined transactions.58 TheArch Coal court
noted this dilemma in its memorandum opinion: "If not enjoined
preliminarily but later found to violate the law, can pre-merger
competition really be recreated; and if enjoined preliminarily, would
the merger be abandoned and thus no longer possible even if
ultimately found lawful?"59
While weighing the equities, the Arch Coal court was persuaded
that the parties would abandon the acquisition if the preliminary
injunction were granted. The opinion noted that "Arch and Triton
will abandon the transaction rather than undergo an administra-
tive proceeding, and any cost savings and output enhancements
that the transactions will create will be lost."6° To support this
finding, the court cited the testimony of Triton CEO James Hake,
who claimed that "Triton [would] abandon" the acquisition, and the
testimony of Arch Coal CEO Steven Leer, who stated that it was
"'very likely' that Arch [would] abandon" the transaction.6'
The Arch Coal court also believed that the relative cost of
granting a preliminary injunction exceeded the relative benefit. The
opinion noted the FTC could "'[unlscrambl[e] the eggs'" due to the
expedient nature of the administrative trial and the discrete nature
of the transaction.62 The FTC usually conducts its trials within one
56. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
58. See id..
59. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 3, at 6 n.2 (citing Heinz, 246 F.3d at 726).
60. FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 160 (D.D.C. 2004).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 159-60.
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year; thus, the court concluded that granting the preliminary
injunction and ultimately dismantling the merger would create
more harm to public and private equities63 than the harm created
by denying the preliminary injunction.6
Although section 11 of the Clayton Act authorizes an administra-
tive trial when the FTC seeks to permanently enjoin a merger,
district court judges realize that they may be making the final
decision. Judges are aware of parties' routine abandonment of their
transactions after courts grant preliminary injunctions, 5 and they
appear to consider this factor despite instruction from the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
In FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., the district court denied a preliminary
injunction based, in large part, on its determination that the parties
would abandon the acquisition if enjoined.66 The court noted: "It is
undisputed that a preliminary injunction would kill this merger....
[I] t is a factor that tips the balance of the equities slightly in favor
of denying the motion."67 The appellate court criticized the district
court's assessment that the parties would abandon the merger,
noting that the one sentence indicating that the injunction would
63. Courts afford public equities more importance than private equities. See, e.g., FTC
v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1225 (11th Cir. 1991) ("[W]e must afford [private
equities] little weight, lest we undermine section 13(b)'s purpose of protecting the public-at-
large, rather than the individual private competitors." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In Arch Coal, the court determined that both public and private equities would arise from
the transaction's completion, including "pro-competitive savings, efficiencies, and a new
strong competitor." Arch Coal, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 160.
64. It should be noted that the Arch Coal court had already decided that the FTC was
unlikely to prevail on the merits in an administrative trial. Public and private equities alone
are insufficient to overcome a strong prima facie case. "Absent a likelihood of success on the
merits, however, equities alone will not justify an injunction."Arch Coal, 329 F. Supp. 2d at
159 (citing FTC v. PPG Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 1500, 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
65. See, e.g., FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597,622 (1966) ('Preliminary' here usually
means final."); FTC v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[A]s a result of the
short life-span of most tender offers, the issuance of a preliminary injunction blocking an
acquisition or merger may prevent the transaction from ever being consummated."); United
States v. Culbro Corp., 436 F. Supp. 746,757-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("[IThe Court concludes that
there is a serious risk that granting the injunction would abort the financing, which would
put an end to the transaction.... These 'factors to which defendants refer cannot be ignored
and are entitled to serious consideration." (quoting United States v. Atl. Richfield Co., 297
F. Supp. 1061, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1969))).
66. FTC v. H.J. Heinz, Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 190, 201 (D.D.C. 2000), rev'd, 246 F.3d 708
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
67. Id.
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"kill" the merger was insufficient to constitute a "factual finding."6 8
The appellate court decided that this consideration should be
accorded little or no weight,69 insisting that the administrative trial
was an effective means of merger enforcement: "[Ihf the merger is
found not to lessen competition substantially, the efficiencies that
the appellees urge can be reclaimed by a renewed transaction."
7 0
Operating under the D.C. Circuit's authority, the Arch Coal court
perhaps ought not have accorded any significance to the parties'
intent to abandon the Arch-Triton transaction. As a legal matter,
if the dual system of a preliminary injunction trial followed by an
administrative trial ultimately harms consumers and companies by
eliminating procompetitive transactions, Congress remains the
proper place for reform. David Balto notes that Congress and the
agencies are appropriate venues for leveling differences in FTC and
DOJ enforcement: "[Bloth Congress and the agencies have an
important job in assuring consistent procedures and legal standards
between the two agencies."71 In the interim, the practical reality of
preliminary injunctions obliges courts to take the proceedings'
often-final nature into account.72
68. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The court distinguished
transactions with tender offers held open for short durations from the Heinz tender offer,
which was sufficiently long so as to withstand administrative proceedings. The court also left
open the possibility that a well-developed factual record could suffice to demonstrate
termination of a deal. See id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 727. The appellate court asserted: "If the merger makes economic sense now,
the appellees have offered no reason why it would not do so later." Id. at 726. The court
rejected the district court's assertion that "the issuance of a preliminary injunction blocking
an acquisition or merger will in all likelihood prevent the transaction from ever being
consummated." Heinz, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 201 (quoting FTC v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336,
1343 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the district court and
enjoined the transaction. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 727.
71. Balto, supra note 50 (arguing that a difference in the FTC's and DOJ's standards
should be leveled by "reform"). "It is highly unlikely that Congress intended or even
considered this disparate result .... Or perhaps they believed a lesser standard for the FTC
was appropriate because the merits would be resolved in an administrative trial. But they
were wrong." Id.
72. The district court in Heinz was ultimately vindicated in its assertion that the parties
would abandon the transaction. "Notwithstanding the skepticism of the Court of Appeals that
an injunction would 'kill this merger,' H.J. Heinz, Co. announced publicly within hours of the
Court of Appeals' decision that it had abandoned its plans to acquire Beech-Nut Foods." FTC
v. H.J. Heinz, Co., 164 F. Supp. 2d 659, 659 (D.D.C. 2001) (mem.) (citation omitted).
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D. Deference to the FTC's Interpretation: The Chevron Doctrine
The Chevron doctrine generally supports the theory that the
district court should defer to the FTC's statutory interpretation of
section 13(b) of the FTC Act and the Clayton Act; the FTC, however,
has not codified its interpretation.73 The Chevron doctrine instructs
federal courts to defer to an agency's understanding of a statute if
Congressional intent is unclear.7 ' The Supreme Court held that
"[wlhen a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory
provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the
agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice
within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail."7' 5 The
Supreme Court reasoned that an agency can better formulate
policy matters than can federal courts because agencies are part of
the executive branch and thus are, in a sense, subject to a constitu-
ency.76
The Chevron doctrine has limited applicability to Arch Coal,
however, because the FTC's position on permanent remedies is not
articulated expressly in its regulations. In 2000, the Supreme Court
clarified the Chevron doctrine in Christensen v. Harris County77 by
noting that the relevant agency interpretation must appear in
"regulation[s]," and not simply in "policy statements, agency
manuals, and enforcement guidelines."78 In best-practice guides and
legal memoranda, the FTC asserts complete authority to structure
divestitures in merger investigations. Yet the FTC's regulations do
not expressly maintain sole province over fashioning remedies. The
Code of Federal Regulations describes detailed procedures for filing
a consent order with the FTC.7' Although chapter 16, parts 2 and
73. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984); see also Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 739 (1996).
74. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 865-66.
77. 529 U.S. at 576 (2000).
78. Id. at 587. But see id. at 589-90 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("While Chevron in fact
involved an interpretive regulation, the rationale of the case was not limited to that context
.... Quite appropriately, therefore, we have accorded Chevron deference not only to agency
regulations, but to authoritative agency positions set forth in a variety of other formats.").
79. See FTC Nonadjudicative Procedures, 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.31-.34 (2005) (discussing consent
order procedure).
2006] 1795
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
3, outline specific procedures for structuring remedial measures
subject to agency approval, the regulations do not establish
authority for such matters with respect to preliminary injunctions. 0
If such a regulation existed, the Chevron doctrine arguably covers
the FTC's discretionary interpretation.8 ' Although Christensen
limited the scope of Chevron, other avenues still exist to preserve
deference to agencies. 2 For example, current case law affords the
FTC broad discretion in the interpretation of its own regulations.
In Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, the Supreme Court held
that the Department of Health and Human Services Secretary's
regulatory interpretation "must be given 'controlling weight unless
it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'"83 This
contemporary endorsement of a traditional principle provides the
FTC with tools to establish authority under certain-albeit
limited-circumstances.
III. REMEDY VS. TRANSACTION: SuBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES
District courts' willingness to evaluate proposed solutions may
turn on the seemingly ephemeral distinction between a remedy and
a part of the initial transaction. Although section 11 of the Clayton
Act establishes the FTC's right to adjudicate "violations," and courts
have afforded the FTC deference in fashioning remedies,' the Arch
Coal court asserted that the Buckskin sale was part of the transac-
tion and, thus, properly considered by the court.8 5 The Arch Coal
court denied that, by hearing evidence of the Buckskin sale, it was
granting a remedy for a potential antitrust violation. Rather, the
80. If the FTC drafted a regulation establishing sole authority for evaluating any
proffered asset sale or license in response to antitrust concerns, it might resolve the
jurisdictional tension between the agency and district courts. A discussion of the viability of
passing such a regulation lies beyond the scope of this Note.
81. See Jeffrey E. Shuren, The Modern Regulatory Administrative State: A Response to
Changing Circumstances, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 291, 321-23 (2001), for a discussion of the
application of Chevron deference under certain circumstances.
82. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504 (1994).
83. Id. at 512 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
84. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
85. See Memorandum Opinion, supra note 3, at 5.
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court proposed that it bore responsibility for "defining the transac-
tion ... being challenged by the FTC."86
Courts struggle over defining transactions correctly. In a
preliminary injunction adjudication, because the antitrust violation
has not yet occurred, a remedy may look exactly like part of the
transaction. When courts have substantively decided to admit
evidence of a proposed fix, two factors exist: formulaic closeness of
the proposal to the transaction and good faith toward developing
and executing a divestiture. The proposal's closeness will often
demonstrate the parties' good faith in implementing a viable,
effective divestiture or licensing agreement.
A. Closeness: Amended Agreements and Enforcement
In FTC v. Libbey, Inc.,88 the FTC sued Libbey, Inc. (Libbey), a
food service glass manufacturer, to obtain a preliminary injunction
to halt Libbey's acquisition of Newall Rubbermaid Inc.'s (Newall)
wholly owned subsidiary, Anchor Hocking Corp. (Anchor).89 One
month after the FTC voted to enjoin the acquisition," Libbey
amended the merger agreement to eliminate the purchase of the
food service business and to provide that a different Newall division
would operate the food service glassware business.9' In this case,
the FTC objected to evidence of the amended agreement in large
part because they viewed the sale as a "sham."92
The court rejected the FTC's argument. On a procedural level, the
court "construe [d]" the FTC as implicitly "challenging the amended
agreement" because the FTC voted to enjoin the merger after
86. Id. at 3.
87. TheArch Coal defendants argued that the divestiture was not proposed "for remedial
purposes, but instead as an intrinsic part of the overall transaction .... [It] is proposed as part
of the underlying acquisition to insure, once consummated, that no violation is likely to
occur." Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 25, at 5. Under this theory, it is difficult to see
how a remedy could ever exist in a preliminary injunction context and not simply be
considered part of the initial transaction.
88. 211 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2002).
89. Id. at 37-38.
90. Id. at 38.
91. Id. at 41.
92. Id. at 42.
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learning of Libbey's restructured agreement.93 On a substantive
level, the court noted that
parties to a merger agreement that is being challenged by the
government can abandon that agreement and propose a new one
in an effort to address the government's concerns. And when
they do so under circumstances as occurred in this case, it
becomes the new agreement that the Court must evaluate in
deciding whether an injunction should be issued.9
The court determined that despite the delayed nature of Libbey's
proposal, the amendment to the merger agreement should be
considered as an inseparable part of the transaction for preliminary
injunction purposes.
Libbey's importance lies in its similarities to Arch Coal, but also
in its differences. In both cases, the parties presented proposed
divestitures after Hart-Scott-Rodino filings and in response to
impending litigation. The FTC determined that neither restruc-
tured transaction resolved concerns about allegedly anticompetitive
mergers.95 The FTC evaluated Newall's maintenance of certain
product lines and determined that the transaction remained
anticompetitive;96 likewise, the FTC evaluated the sale of Buckskin
to Kiewit and determined that the transaction remained
anticompetitive.
Important differences exist between the two cases, however.
Unlike in Arch Coal, the FTC inLibbey relied almost entirely on an
argument that the "fix" was an attempt to evade judicial review.
Even more significantly, Libbey amended its merger agreement,
93. Id. at 46.
94. Id. (emphasis added); see also Memorandum Opinion, supra note 3, at 3-4 (quoting
Libbey, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 46). But see Casey R. Triggs, Shielding Consumers from Risk: FTC
Divestiture Policy, ANTITRUST, Fall 2002, at 75, 77 (arguing that the district court also
considered the first merger agreement: "[Tihe Commission successfully obtained a
preliminary injunction ... by convincing the district court that both the original merger
agreement and a restructured transaction would lead to anticompetitive effects."). Because
the FTC ultimately prevailed, the court vindicated the FTC's argument that the proposed
remedy was not sufficient. Triggs further notes that "threats by the merging parties to take
their 'fix' to a judge are unlikely to influence a Commission resolved to accept only rigorous
merger consents." Id.
95. See Libbey, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 38; see also FTC Complaint, supra note 4, at 20.
96. See Libbey, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 38.
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whereas Arch Coal did not 7-a technical element to which Libbey
repeatedly referred.9 The Libbey court mused that no precedent
existed for how to treat an "amended merger agreement" as opposed
to an "original agreement."9 The court added that the parties
proposed the amended agreement to mollify the FTC, and the FTC
reviewed the amended agreement; the amended agreement,
therefore, was properly before the court. 0 The court also accepted
the defendant's argument that the court must consider "whether
the amended agreement raises sufficient anti-trust concerns."1 1
The Arch Coal court did not require any formal amendment or
revision to the initial acquisition agreement. Drawing heavily on
Libbey, the court admitted evidence of the Buckskin sale, partly
because the FTC had the opportunity to review the restructured
transactions in both cases.1 2 The Arch Coal court reasoned that the
FTC similarly considered the sale of Buckskin to Kiewit, so that
sale could also be considered part of the transaction. 10 3 The Arch
Coal court nonetheless decided that even though Arch Coal had not
amended its May 29,2003, merger agreement, it would consider the
Buckskin sale as part of the Triton acquisition: "[Tihe Court does
not find this structural choice to be dispositive on the issue [of]
whether the Kiewit transaction should be considered in the
preliminary injunction proceeding."0 4
Although seemingly a mere technical distinction, the construction
of the merger agreement can be important for enforcement. Section
13(b) accords the district court authority to grant or deny a
preliminary injunction, as well as to issue hold-separate orders or
to issue other limited forms of equitable relief' No statutory
97. FTC Memorandum, supra note 5, at 4; see also Defendants' Memorandum, supra note
25, at 3 (describing the Kiewit sale as a "new supplemental agreement").
98. Libbey, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 46.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Memorandum Opinion, supra note 3, at 4-5, 7-8.
103. Id. at 4-5.
104. Id. at 4.
105. See, e.g., FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901,907 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[The statutory
grant of the power to issue a preliminary injunction carries with it the power to issue
whatever ancillary equitable relief is necessary to the effective exercise of the granted
power."); FTC v. H. N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Congress ... also
gave the district court authority to grant any ancillary relief necessary to accomplish
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provision, however, affirmatively permits the district court to deny
the injunction but order the collateral sale. 106 Although the FTC
may issue a consent order0 7 constructed from private negotiations
with parties, district courts have not attempted to issue such a
remedial order. Although the Arch Coal court would be predictably
maddened if the parties abandoned the Buckskin sale, no precedent
exists to prevent breaking a separate contractual agreement in an
FTC Act or Clayton Act action in district court.0 8 The FTC must
initiate administrative action, find a violation, issue a cease-and-
desist order, and negotiate a consent decree.
09
The agreement between Arch Coal and Kiewit provided that after
May 17, 2004, either Arch Coal or Kiewit could abandon the
Buckskin sale if Arch Coal's acquisition of Triton had not closed."0
The FTC argued that "Arch's proposed 'remedy' may never occur
because the agreement to sell Buckskin is a separate agreement...
and nothing precludes the parties from voluntarily agreeing to
renegotiate or modify the agreement after the Acquisition is
consummated.""' Arch Coal contended, however, that this option
changed nothing; the walk-away portion in the supplemental
agreement also existed in the original agreement between Arch
Coal and Triton." 2
Although the court conceded that "theoretically the parties could
renegotiate the Kiewit deal," it ultimately relied on the perceived
intent of Arch Coal's and Kiewit's senior executives to consummate
the transaction."' Indeed, Kiewit COO Bruce Grewcock stated in
his deposition that Kiewit would sue Arch Coal if the Buckskin sale
complete justice because it did not limit that traditional equitable power explicitly or by
necessary and inescapable inference.").
106. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 43,
FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 04-0534) [hereinafter
Plaintiffs Memorandum], available at http'//www.ftc.gov/os/2004/04/archcoalmemo.pdf
("Moreover, the court would maintain no continuing jurisdiction under § 13(b) to oversee the
Buckskin sale.").
107. See supra note 79.
108. See Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 106, at 42-44.
109. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
110. See FTC Memorandum, supra note 5, at 4 n.8 (referencing article XII, section 12.1(d)
of the Asset Purchase Agreement between Arch Coal and Kiewit).
111. Id. at 2.
112. See Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 25, at 10 n.7.
113. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 3, at 5.
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were not completed." 4 This testimony develops a record of good-
faith commitment; such reliance on independent decisions between
private parties alone, however, ignores the FTC's obligations to
enforce the Clayton Act and FTC Act. The agency should not have
to rely on Kiewit, a nonparty, to sue Arch Coal in order to effectuate
meaningful antitrust enforcement.
The court considered the two transactions as one for the purposes
of antitrust analysis, yet it did not issue an order for the Buckskin
sale." 5 When a court relies so heavily on a proposed remedy in
denying a preliminary injunction, as it did in Arch Coal,"6 it ought
to strictly analyze whether that proposed divestiture is an enforce-
able part of the transaction.
By amending merger agreements, companies demonstrate that
a proposed sale exists as an inextricable part of an initial transac-
tion. The testimony of executives at trial, which is useful for
discerning intent, is only one method of measuring good faith in
completing both transactions. The court should require private
parties to amend their merger agreements, order a consent decree
reached, or order the divestiture; all such actions would demon-
strate commitment to the divestiture and provide the FTC with the
necessary means of enforcement.
B. Good-Faith Effort
When evaluating proposed divestitures, courts should also weigh
the parties' good faith in three areas: the parties' willingness to
carry out the proposed remedy, their efforts in negotiating a remedy
with the FTC,"7 and creation of a viable remedy that restores pre-
merger competition. These three factors will help to ensure that the
parties' solutions are only considered when they are procedurally
safeguarded. A district court should not arbitrate remedies by
selectively picking and structuring divestitures." 8 Rather, when a
114. Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 25, at 10 n.6.
115. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 3, at 5, 8.
116. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
117. See FTC v. Libbey, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 34, 46 n.27 (D.D.C. 2002) (noting that good
faith may be shown by structuring a divestiture that addresses the FTC's concern with the
transaction). Libbey's good-faith requirement, however, defines parties' obligations too
narrowly.
118. See supra note 7; infra Part IV.
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district court analyzes the relevant transaction, it should require
the defendant to demonstrate affirmatively that the proffered
divestiture was an inseparable and viable part of the transaction.
In United States v. Franklin Electric Co.,"' the court also
considered the parties' divestiture but ultimately concluded that it
was insufficient to restore premerger competition. 2 ° In Franklin
Electric, the DOJ sued a manufacturer of submersible turbine
pumps to obtain a permanent injunction preventing the manufac-
turer from acquiring United Dominion, the only other company
making those pumps.' 2 ' Franklin Electric amended the joint
venture one day before the DOJ filed the complaint in district
court.'22 The amended agreement contained a licensing clause that
assigned certain intellectual property rights, products, and brand
names from United Dominion to Environ, a company that supplied
petroleum equipment. 2 ' As in Libbey, the DOJ filed a motion in
limine to exclude evidence of the licensing arrangement, but the
court denied the motion. 4 Also as in Libbey, the court ultimately
granted the preliminary injunction after determining that the
proposed license would not resolve competition concerns.'25
The Franklin Electric court seemed unconvinced of the parties'
good-faith intent in drafting the amendment. In fact, the court
appeared to find the complete absence of Franklin Electric's
good faith dispositive in granting the preliminary injunction. 2 '
Regarding structuring an effective remedy, the court rejected the
parties' contention that licenses for Environ would preserve
competition; instead, the court concluded that Environ would
operate with significant disadvantages compared to the lone
remaining competitor in the market for submersible pumps.'27
119. 130 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (W.D. Wis. 2000).
120. Id. at 1035-36.
121. Id. at 1026.
122. See Willie L. Hudgins, Handling Evidence of Settlement/Divestiture Offers in
Litigation, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: TRYINGAND WINNINGA CwILANTITRUST CASE 179,
183 (2001).
123. See Franklin Elec., 130 F. Supp. 2d at 1026, 1030.
124. See Hudgins, supra note 122, at 185-87.
125. Franklin Elec., 130 F. Supp. 2d at 1035-36.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 1033-35.
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In analyzing the proposed licensing agreement, the court looked
at a variety of factors, including Environ's knowledge of the
industry, the company's business plan, its due diligence, and the
transaction's structure. 128 The court noted that Environ did not
manufacture submersible pumps, that Environ had no business
plan for the new technology, and that Environ failed to complete
due diligence when it signed the agreement.'29 The court also found
that Environ's sales efforts would fall short-Environ already
prioritized another investment in a major, unrelated project. 0 The
court also determined that, under the licensing agreement, profits
from the submersible pumps might be so low as to drive Environ
out of the market.'
The timing of Environ's licensing agreement hints at the parties'
reluctance to negotiate this issue with the government. The process
by which government attorneys and private parties conduct
merger reviews can be cooperative or adversarial; the FTC was not
created as a prosecutorial agency, but "as an aid to business.' 3 2 To
facilitate expediency, judicial efficiency, and compliance with
antitrust laws, parties are encouraged to present their arguments
informally and to discuss possible divestitures with both the FTC
and the DOJ. ss
In Franklin Electric, the parties approached the DOJ with the
proposed solution of licensing certain rights to Environ. The
government rejected the restructured agreement, in part, because
the parties merely signed a letter of intent, and "no definitive
agreement had been reached."' Furthermore, the parties decided
to move forward with the licensing agreement only one day before
128. See id. at 1030-31.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 1033.
131. Id. at 1034.
132. Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and
Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 53 (2003).
133. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENT OF THE FTC's BUREAU OF COMPETITION ON
NEGOTIATING MERGER REMEDIES (2003), available at httpJ/www.ftc.gov/bc/bestpractices/
bestpractices030401.htm (Apr. 2, 2003) ("The parties will likely negotiate the terms of the
proposed decision and order with the staffat the same time they are negotiating terms of the
purchase agreement with the proposed up-front buyer.").
134. See Hudgins, supra note 122, at 182-83. The DOJ also rejected the agreement because
it believed that the licensing agreement did not resolve concerns about the transaction, as
the FTC believed in Libbey and Arch Coal. See id. at 183.
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the DOJ filed its complaint in district court. 3 s Franklin Electric
and United Dominion amended their joint venture on May 30,2000,
although they still had no actual licensing agreement.'36 The
parties finally produced the agreement and all necessary residual
agreements on June 23, 2000.137
The court did not discuss the parties' delay in amending the joint
venture; this maneuver, however, cannot have assisted the parties'
demonstration that the licensing agreement was produced in good
faith. The court not only dismissed the proposed fix, but it ridiculed
the arrangement as "nothing more than insubstantial window
dressing to conceal [Franklin Electric's] monopolistic motives."131
Courts are skeptical of parties who restructure business transac-
tions after the parties realize that they cannot escape litigation.'39
In Hospital Corp. ofAmerica v. FTC, Hospital Corporation appealed
from an FTC administrative decision that found that the acquisition
of two hospitals violated section 7 of the Clayton Act. 4 ° Judge
Posner spoke harshly on whether to include evidence that one of
the acquired hospitals was now managed by a different company:
"[The FTC] was not required to take account of a post-acquisition
transaction that may have been made to improve Hospital
Corporation's litigating position."'
The Hospital Corp. court emphasized that merging parties can
make this evidence "subject to manipulation," and thus, the
evidence should be "entitled to little or no weight."'42 In addition to
evidence manipulation, the court decided that value exists in
excluding proposed fixes because such action will "simplify the
adjudication of merger cases."" Hospital Corp., however, contained
a brief substantive analysis, noting that the FTC also need not
consider such evidence because the loss of one hospital would not
alter the decision.'"
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. United States v. Franklin Elec. Co., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1034 (W.D. Wis. 2000).
139. See, e.g., Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1384 (7th Cir. 1986).
140. See id. at 1383.
141. Id. at 1384.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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Hospital Corp. differs substantively from Arch Coal, Franklin
Electric, and Libbey because in Hospital Corp. the FTC brought suit
after the acquisition had already closed and an administrative trial
occurred. 45 Yet Judge Posner's underlying critique of the parties
nonetheless applies to private parties in Section 7 cases even before
they close their transactions. After all, after being notified of
antitrust concerns, parties can restructure a transaction solely to
avoid litigation either prior to or after closing the initial deal. The
parties' inherent motivation in both instances remains the same.
To ameliorate these concerns, courts should require a high
standard of good faith when determining whether to include the
parties' remedy as part of the transaction. The merger agreement
should be amended as a pledge of commitment to the transaction
itself, or judicially enforceable mechanisms should be implemented
to ensure that the FTC can enforce the sale. Courts should also
evaluate good faith in the parties' willingness to carry out the
proposed remedy, the parties' willingness to negotiate in good faith
with the FTC, and whether the parties have structured a viable
remedy to ensure that frivolous or ineffective divestitures do not
deflect attention from possible antitrust violations.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A district court's level of consideration of proposed divestiture
evidence, ranging from completely dismissing the evidence to
relying heavily on the evidence, has many important consequences
for the public, the government, and private parties. In 1914,
President Woodrow Wilson spearheaded the effort to establish the
FTC's predecessor, the Bureau of Corporations.'46 Wilson wanted to
create a commission that operated as "'the instrument of a free
government, a government free to serve the interests of the people
and quickly responsive to the opinions of the people, with no
intermediaries to interpret the interests of business." 47 Currently,
the FTC describes its task as "ensur[ing] that free markets
work-that competition among producers and accurate information
145. See id.
146. See generally Winerman, supra note 132 (discussing the origins of the FTC and
President Wilson's role in creating the agency).
147. Id. at 46-47 (quoting a speech given by President Woodrow Wilson).
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in the hands of consumers create the incentives to generate the best
products at the lowest prices, spur efficiency and innovation,
strengthen the economy, and produce benefits for consumers." 8
Invested with responsibility for safeguarding public welfare, the
FTC should be afforded deference to complete its task effectively
within established legal parameters."4
Courts, practitioners, legal scholars, and the government concede
that including evidence of proposed remedies in a trial for prelimi-
nary relief often hinders the government's ability to prepare and
present its case. 50 Due to the relative dearth of case law on this
particular issue, district courts are not bound by an extensive body
of appellate or Supreme Court rulings. Courts should therefore
require parties to meet stringent good-faith standards, as outlined
in the previous Part, because the policy implications for antitrust
enforcement, which are crucial to consumer welfare and market
efficiency, are significant.
In Arch Coal, the FTC argued that evidence of the proposed sale
of Buckskin to Kiewit would prejudice the integrity and effective-
ness of its administrative trial.'5 ' First, the FTC claimed that if the
court allowed the merger to proceed, the Buckskin sale would alter
market dynamics so as to "compromise" the FTC's authority to
"impose an appropriate remedy" in an administrative trial.152
Second, the FTC claimed that if the district court denied the
preliminary injunction without an order on the Buckskin sale, the
FTC could not "restore competition to the pre-merger status quo"
because, in the interim, Arch Coal would be permitted to "dismantle
148. 2004 FTC PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILrTY REPORT 8, available at http'J/www.
ftc.gov/opp/gpra/2004parreport.pdf.
149. For a discussion of the ability of agencies (as opposed to courts) to implement and
execute policy, see Shuren, supra note 81, at 328. "Because of their specialization and
expertise, agencies provide the legislative and executive branches with a mechanism for
anticipating future economic and social needs and for responding rapidly and effectively to
changing conditions without sacrificing political accountability." Id.
150. See, e.g., FTC v. Libbey, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 34, 46 n.27 (D.D.C. 2002); see also
Hudgins, supra note 122, at 181 ("The Government has much to lose and little to gain when
the defense shifts the focus of the litigation to its proposed fix."); Jaret Seiberg, The Problem
of Preemptive Divestiture, DAILY DEAL, Dec. 23, 2003 ("Such moves to fix a deal with a judge's
consent can hamper the government's ability to prove that the deal violates the law."); supra
note 7 and accompanying text (noting some difficulties with including evidence of remedies).
151. See FTC Memorandum, supra note 5, at 2.
152. Id.
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Triton."'53 Finally, the FTC argued that without an amended
merger agreement, "no means" existed by which the district court
could grant "ultimate, permanent relief" and this would prejudice
the FTC's administrative trial.'
In addition to creating difficulties during the FTC's administra-
tive adjudication, evidence of proposed remedies also impacts FTC
strategy during negotiations with parties and during the trial for a
preliminary injunction. Willie Hudgins, former DOJ deputy chief of
litigation, noted three policy and procedural reasons why the
government may wish to exclude evidence of a remedy:
1) it distracts the Government from presenting, and the court
from focusing, on the most powerful evidence of anticompetitive
effects from the transaction as initially proposed; 2) it allows
evidence of the remedy to be considered before liability has been
established; and 3) it adds to the Government's burden by
requiring evidence on some future transaction.'55
In a short time period, Franklin Electric forced the DOJ to change
a complex merger analysis of anticompetitive effects to include a
proposed licensing agreement.
Even if the FTC spends months contemplating a divestiture, it
must prepare a multifaceted litigation strategy with econometric
data for a variety of transactions. After a court determines that
evidence of a proposed fix will be included, the FTC must prove that
the initial agreement will likely be anticompetitive and must also
argue against any and all remedies offered by the parties. 56 The
private parties, however, have often been contemplating their
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Hudgins, supra note 122, at 181 (footnote omitted).
156. Attorneys acknowledge the practical difficulty that accompanies litigating against
proposed remedies: "You have, at least hypothetically, a moving target problem, especially
with divestitures.'" Marcus & Seiberg, supra note 7, at 15 (quoting Molly Boast, partner at
Debevoise & Plimpton and former director of the FTC Bureau of Competition); see also
Seiberg, supra note 150 ("Much of the evidence and analysis used to attack the original deal
may be irrelevant or require updating in the weeks before the preliminary injunction
hearing.").
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changed position for a longer duration and have more time to
prepare.
5 7
In Libbey, the court recognized policy concerns that might result
from admitting evidence of proposed remedies. The Libbey court's
opinion conceded that it was "not unsympathetic to the FTC's
argument that parties to an agreement might, in some cases,
unscrupulously attempt to avoid judicial and FTC review of an
agreement by continuously amending it."5 ' The court noted that a
fact-specific inquiry must be undertaken in every case to determine
whether the parties have constructed a remedy for improper
purposes, such as a mere litigation tactic.159
The antitrust community recognized the impact of Libbey and
Franklin Electric, and practitioners wondered if inclusion of
proposed fixes would give private parties a stronger negotiating
position in the merger review process. 60 Some antitrust lawyers for
the defense bar became emboldened by these decisions, musing that
"[riecent history has shown that private parties have become
particularly fearful of litigating against the government.... Now ...
perhaps parties will be a bit more aggressive."' 6' The government
may find that a private party will litigate if not satisfied by the
merger review outcome, thus decreasing the government's bargain-
ing power with respect to fashioning divestitures. 2 Negotiation,
however, is a policy that the courts should strive to encourage. As
discussed in Part III, open communication between the government
and private parties during the review often creates solutions that
preserve premerger competition without the expense of litigation.
In pursuit of efficiency, parties may now decide to save time and
money by negotiating less and proceeding immediately to court in
157. Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that, in Libbey, "[tihe FTC was suddenly
forced to pursue its [section] 7 claims under materially different facts, while the defendants
had time to prepare their case before presenting their sanitized transaction to the court").
Private parties, in addition, arguably possess more resources to mount multiple defenses for
the transaction than the FTC or the DOJ possess to litigate against them.
158. FTC v. Libbey, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 34, 46 n.27 (D.D.C. 2002).
159. See id. ("However, based upon the facts of this case, the Court is not convinced that
defendants were in fact purposely attempting to avoid judicial and FTC review of their
agreement.").
160. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
161. Sean F. Boland & Virginia R. Metallo, Hear Our Divestitures: We Must Consider
Parties' Own Proposed Remedies, Says District Court, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 6, 2000, at 41.
162. See id.
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an attempt to complete their transactions more quickly and as
originally structured.163 Court consideration of proposed solutions
has proven to be a positive development toward achieving that
result. 164 Furthermore, as Part II demonstrated, a court's consider-
ation of proposed remedies can often mean the difference between
completing transactions and abandoning them.165 If the parties'
opportunity for litigating against a possible antitrust violation only
occurs in district court, a court's evaluation of a proposed remedy
can potentially save the transaction.166
Other groups worry that these decisions will deprive the
government of enforcement mechanisms necessary to complete its
charge of consumer protection and market oversight: "If merging
parties are sanctioned by the courts to effectuate 11th-hour merger
modifications that handicap the FTC's litigation efforts and
negotiating curative transactions with a judge, denying the FTC
settlement oversight and review, the rule of FTC designed
preclosing merger settlements may soon become the exception." 67
The FTC's administrative knowledge in resolving section 7 and FTC
Act violations then becomes irrelevant, as district courts subsume
the FTC's responsibility. 16 The transition of authority from the
FTC to the judiciary thwarts congressional intent and detracts
from effective and informed antitrust enforcement.' 69 In a study
conducted on divestitures, the FTC found that sellers historically
distort elements of their asset sales to potential buyers.170 If
the FTC maintains jurisdiction in this arena, its expertise will help
to minimize these occurrences. 17' A district court, however, does
163. See id.
164. Jaret Seiberg, Coal Merger Is a Pit for FTC, DAILY DEAL, Oct. 23, 2004 ("[M]ost
companies are willing to divest assets as part of a settlement to avoid a fight. [Judge] Bates
may have changed that calculus.").
165. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
167. Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 7, at 3.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. STAFF OF THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION OF THE FTC, A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION'S
DIVESTITURE PROCESS 8 (1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/08/divestiture.pdf
("[R]espondents ... may engage in strategic conduct to impede the success of the buyer; and
... most buyers of divested assets do not have access to sufficient information to prevent
mistakes in the course of their acquisitions.").
171. See Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 7, at 3.
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not possess the same experience to aid in determining viable
divestitures.'72
CONCLUSION
The FTC's specialized knowledge and developed expertise in
antitrust and consumer protection should be afforded deference.
173
Based on statutory instruction, case law, and policy considerations,
a district court should listen to parties' evidence of a proposed fix
under narrow circumstances. Section 13(b) of the FTC Act still vests
the FTC in the first instance with authority to conduct trials on the
merits to determine violations of antitrust laws. Unless Congress
changes the law, the FTC's burden differs from that of the DOJ or
private plaintiffs under section 13(b). District courts, aware of the
practical importance of their decisions, need not only analyze a
"hypothetical transaction"'74 that will not, in fact, occur. Courts
must determine whether an injunction serves the public interest,
and the courts therefore have a duty to evaluate the whole transac-
tion.
Yet the policy concerns arising from admitting such evidence,
such as ensuring procompetitive mergers, encouraging negotiation
between the government and the parties, and enabling the FTC to
complete its charge to effectively oversee and enforce antitrust laws,
172. See id.
173. This would include, although beyond the scope of this Note, deference to the FTC's
theory of market definition and coordinated effects. The FTC staff and administrative law
judges' experiences with certain economic matters surpass that of the district court. See
Balto, supra note 50 (noting that "[aidministrative litigation is also a critical forum for
development of complex legal and economic issues that require extensive expert testimony
and the deliberation of an expert body such as the Commission"). Historically, antitrust
jurisprudence recognized the importance of administrative expertise in enforcing antitrust
laws, from structuring orders to determining market power. In FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S.
683 (1948), the Court noted that Congress passed the FTC Act to provide courts with
"assistance of men trained to combat monopolistic practices in the framing ofjudicial decrees
in antitrust litigation," id. at 726. Scholars and practitioners have widely debated whether
the FTC tribunal actually possesses increased ability to understand and evaluate complex
economic issues. For an argument that FTC processes must be reworked to "realize the
potential for success in antitrust decision making," see William E. Kovacic, Administrative
Adjudication and the Use of New Economic Approaches in Antitrust Analysis, 5 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 313, 320 (1997).
174. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 3, at 3 (citing Defendants' Memorandum, supra
note 25, at 2).
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are significant. For these reasons, a district court should require
defendants to amend their merger agreements or create FTC-
enforceable consent orders, as well as demonstrate good-faith
efforts to structure viable divestitures that will maximize public
equities, carry out the proposed divestiture, and negotiate a sale or
licensing agreement with the FTC prior to trial.
Katherine A. Ambrogi*
* Many thanks to Michael Moiseyev, Assistant Director at the FTC Bureau of
Competition, for his assistance in developing this topic.
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